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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action involved a boundary dispute in a rural area of
Springville, Utah.

The plaintiffs, the Judd Family Partnership

(hereinafter "Judds"),

filed a Complaint against the Hutchings

and Shermans (hereinafter "Hutchings") seeking to quiet title, to
relocate the fence line and to obtain damages.

(R. 1-3).

The

Hutchings counterclaimed for basically the same thing; however,
no affirmative defenses, such as estoppel, were set forth in the
Hutchings1 Answer and Counterclaim.

(R. 12-15).

At trial, on

September 5, 1985, the Judds sought to quiet title on the deed
line

set

forth by

the description

on their

deed, while the

Hutchings sought to quiet title on the existing fence line.

For clarity, counsel filed with the trial court a Stipulation
as to the issues and attached a copy of the pertinent survey.
(R. 43-46).

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is said Stipulation

and survey copy.

The Judd property is located to the south and

the Hutchings to the north.

The description on the Judd deed

places the boundary at one point, the description on the Hutchings
deed places the boundary at another point, and the fence line is
at yet another place—see Addendum.
The Stipulation

states that a survey was performed by a

Donald C. Cole, based upon both the Hutchings1 and Judds' deeds
and that the only boundary in dispute is the southern Hutchings
boundary and the Judd northern boundary, and that further, the
only

issues before the trial court were the location

of the

proper boundary, the payment of the expense for relocating the
fence should that prove necessary, and the possibility of damages
awarded to the Judds by reason of the disputed boundary.

(R. 43-

46, 128-129).
Undisputed testimony at trial revealed that the Judd property
and description originated from a patent in 1833 and that the
Sherman (predecessors of the Hutchings) property and overlapping
description originated from a patent in 1884.
overlap

in descriptions existed

137) .
2

(R. 136-7).

from that time forward.

The
(R.

Three witnesses for the Judds testified that since 1953 the
existing fence had been relocated at least three different times,
in 1958, 1977 and 1978, and that it had at various times been
constructed of different materials, iron posts with barbed wire
and cedar posts with pine, and that it had at one time abutted the
barn and at other times run 4-6 feet from the barn.

(R. 154-56,

160, 170-72, 193-94, 197).
Taxes have always been paid by the Judds to the most northern
boundary line set forth in the Judd deed.

(R. 156) .

The Judds

were informed long ago by Mr. Liechty, an owner prior to the
Hutchings and Shermans, that the fence line was not correct.
158).

(R.

After having a survey done by Mr. Cole, Mr. Hutchings

requested that Judds sign a quit claim deed giving Hutchings the
property to the fence line claiming that there was a mere four
feet

difference, whereupon

Judds

consulted

Mr.

Cole

survey and found there to be a 56-58 feet difference.
The trial

court held

and

the

(R. 173).

for the defendants, Hutchings, and

ruled on the basis of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence,
thus placing the boundary on the fence line.

(R. 86-89).

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment
were signed on January 23, 1986 (R. 102-109) and the Judds filed
their Notice of Appeal on February 21, 1986.

3

(R. 114).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The law in Utah regarding boundary disputes is set forth in
Halladav v. Cluff. 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984).

There, the Court

stated its desire to enhance- reliance upon property dimensions
set forth in county records.

Because of the weight given to

record title, the availability of survey information in platted
areas, and advances in survey technology, greater reliance upon
record title information and lesser reliance upon boundary by
acquiescence is mandated.

Furthermore, this Court relegated the

status of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence to an exception
to the rule, that exception being that "only when it is not
reasonable to expect landowners to ascertain thes true location of
the boundary by [record title information] should landowners be
allowed to claim boundary by acquiescence."

685 P.2d at 505.

In the instant case, a survey was performed, upon which both
parties stipulate reliance.

The only issue properly before the

trial court was which of the two deed lines was correct.
by

acquiescence

descriptions

should

overlap

not

and

have

been

the error

original patents of 1833 and 1884.

considered.

is traceable

Boundary
The

deed

back to the

The Judd property was first

deeded out and outlined in. 1883, prior to the Hutchings property.
That fact is not disputed.

The trial court should not have even

reached the question of boundary by acquiescence; however, once
4

addressed, the elements of boundary by acquiescence were not met.
The

fence

line

upon

which

Hutchings

claimed

boundary

by

acquiescence has been moved several times over the years, and as
recently as 1978.

Clearly, this does not meet the 20 years

required for boundary by acquiescence.

Further, the Judds were

aware that the fence line did not represent the boundary line and,
therefore, there was never a mutual acquiescence.
Clearly, the mere fact of a fence line does not establish
boundary by acquiescence, especially where there exists a reliable
survey and reliable evidence as to priority of title.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ONLY ISSUE PROPERLY BEFORE THE TRIAL
COURT WAS WHICH OF TWO DEED LINES WAS CORRECT
AND, THEREFORE, BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE SHOULD
NEVER HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED.
This Court has set forth the law regarding boundary disputes
in the cases of Halladav v. Cluff. 685 P.2d

500

(Utah 1984),

Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984), and Parsons v.
Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984).
In

the

leading

case,

Halladay

v.

Cluff,

Justice

Oaks,

writing for the majority, was careful to clarify and distinguish
preceding

cases

which

had

created

"considerable

regarding the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.

5

confusion"

First, this Court stated that

ff

the law clearly gives prece-

dent to the record title with boundary by acquiescence being an
exception.If
Second, it was clearly set forth in Halladay that there must
be a showing of uncertainty or dispute as to the boundary line.
Third,

"dispute" is not proved

by

a mere

difference

of

opinion.
In writing the Halladay decision, this Court defined the
parameters within which the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
could be used.

The Court considered two worthy but sometimes

conflicting interests:

1) a desire to confirm boundaries that

have been recognized on the ground over a long period of time,
and 2) the desire to enhance reliance upon the property dimensions
shown in county records.

The Court concluded that based upon the

weight the law clearly gives to record title, the availability of
survey information in platted areas, and the advances in survey
technology,

greater

reliance

on

record

title

information

and

lesser reliance on boundary by acquiescence should be the governing standard.
In general, when
survey
information
is
reasonably available . . .
so that it is
reasonable to expect the parties to locate
their boundary on the ground by surveys, the
court should be less willing to apply the
doctrine
of
boundary
by
acquiescence.
Halladay at 504.
6

As set forth above, this Court relegated the status of the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence to an exception to the rule,
that exception being that "only when it is not reasonable to
expect landowners to ascertain the true location of the boundary
by

[record title information] should landowners be allowed to

claim boundary by acquiescence.

Halladay at 505.

The burden of proof as to any uncertainty of boundaries,
which must be met before the elements of boundary by acquiescence
can be considered, is placed upon the party claiming boundary by
acquiescence.

Halladay at 507.

In the instant case, there is no uncertainty as to the true
location of the boundaries between the Judd and the Hutchings
property.
the Judd
property.
survey.

The Cole survey clearly shows the deed description of
property

and

The parties

the deed

description

stipulated

of the

Hutchings

as to the accuracy

of the

The trial court need have only determined, according to

the evidence, which deed had priority.

The testimony was undis-

puted that the Judd property and corresponding description was
first, originally from the 183 3 patent, with the Judd property in
1834.
As in the Halladay case, "the evidence clearly shows that
both claimants had ready access to deeds and had actually examined
surveys clearly establishing the
7

[plaintiffs1] record title to

the property in dispute.

Consequently, the doctrine of boundary

by acquiescence is inapplicable as a matter of law . . . "
Incidentally, this Court noted that when boundary by acquiescence was first introduced in Utah a century ago, Switzaable
v. Worseldine, 5 Utah 315, 15 P. 144 (1877), much of the state
had not been surveyed and searches of record title were difficult
to conduct.

Halladay at 504.

Here, the property in dispute is

in a platted area, the parties stipulated as to the accuracy of
the survey and the only question is which deed line should be
acknowledged.

The fence line should not even have been a choice

because the Hutchings did not meet their burden of showing an
"objective uncertainty."
The Judds submit that even the choice of the Hutchings1 deed
line would have been more legally sound than to have chosen the
fence line.
POINT II
THE ELEMENTS OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE HAVE
NOT BEEN MET.
In

Stratford

v.

Morgan,

689

P.2d

360

(Utah

1984),

the

parties acquired adjoining tracts of land from a common grantor
on the same day in 1904.

A fence had existed along a boundary,

but the plaintiff's predecessor constructed a new fence somewhat
south of the boundary line.

He used the small lane between the

fences to drive his cattle from a corral that had been construct8

ed.

Some years later, the original fence and corral were torn

down and later, plaintiff put up another fence.
v. Bradford, 2 Utah 2d 119, 269 P.2d

1053

Citing Rinqwood

(1954), this Court

stated that:
The theory under which a boundary line is
established by long acquiescence along an
existing fence line is founded on the doctrine
that the parties erect the fence to settle
some doubt or uncertainty which they may have
as to the location of the true boundary, and
they compromise their differences by agreeing
to accept the fence line as the limiting line
of their respective lands.
The mere fact
that a fence happens to be put up and neither
party does anything about it for a long
period of time will not establish it as the
true boundary.
In the

instant case, the fence line was not erected to

resolve a boundary dispute, and in fact, the fence never for
certain

represented

the boundary

because, as testified

to by

three separate witnesses, it was moved a number of feet on at
least three occasions over the years.
One witness testified that the fence was taken down in 1958,
in 1977 and in 1978.

At one time, an existing ditch was trans-

formed into a cement ditch and this construction caused the fence
to be moved several feet.

(R. 154-6, 172).

Further, the fence

was originally placed a few feet north of where it now stands,
but it was moved closer to the Judd barn in 1978 because snow

9

continually fell off the roof and knocked the fence over.

(R.

170-171, 193-194).
A boundary line, to be established by
acquiescence, must be definite, certain, and
not speculative. Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah
2d 282, 421 P.2d 944 (1966).
Furthermore, one witness testified that during the time that
the fence was being repaired and moved, he had spoken to a prior
owner of the Hutchings property, a Mr. Liechty, who stated that it
did not really matter too much where the fence was located because
the fence was not on the correct deed line and would need to be
moved further onto the Hutchings property.
Although the trial court should not even have reached the
question of boundary by acquiescence because the Hutchings did
not meet their burden of proof as to uncertainty, it is clear that
the existing fence line should not have been utilized for boundary
by acquiescence since it has been moved several times and was
never intended to be the boundary line.
Further, since the fence line has been altered by more than
a few feet as recently as 1977 and again in 1978, the boundary
line does not meet the element of "a long period of time" which
has been defined as at least 20 years.

Halladay at 503, Parsons

v. Anderson, 690 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah 1984).
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POINT III
TESTIMONY AS TO A PRIOR CONVERSATION WITH THE
HUTCHINGS1 PREDECESSOR WAS ADMISSIBLE
AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE.
The Judds presented evidence through testimony of a member
of the Judd family who stated that while the fence was being
repaired and moved, he had spoken with a Mr. Liechty, a prior
owner of the Hutchings property.

Mr. Liechty stated that it did

not really matter too much where the fence was located because
the fence was not on the correct deed line and would need to be
moved further onto the Hutchings property.

At trial, the defen-

dants, the Hutchings, objected to this proffer on the grounds of
hearsay.

The Judds submit that this evidence is admissible as an

exception to the hearsay rule.
In the case of Roach v. Dahl, 35 P.2d 993 (Utah 1934), the
issue revolved around a proper location of a section cornerstone.
After examining the facts, the Utah Supreme Court stated that
"hearsay evidence is admissible in a case of this kind to prove
the location of a corner or boundary line.11

The Court did not

supply its own reasoning for this rule but did cite the Washington case of Inmon v. Pearson, 92 P. 279 (Wash. 1907).
In the Inmon case, the Court, in discussing the reasoning
behind the exception to the hearsay rule, stated:
In the United States hearsay evidence is
admissible both upon questions of boundary
11

affecting public rights and also in the case
of disputes as to boundaries between private
landowners.
This rule is also set forth by Greenleaf on Evidence, Section
170.

Further, in Boardman v. Lessees of Reed, 6 Pet. (U.S.) 328,

8 L.Ed. 415, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking
through Mr. Justice McClean, said that:
Boundaries may be proved by hearsay testimony
is rule well settled and a necessity of
propriety of which is not now questioned.
Some difference of opinion may exist as to
the application of this rule, but there can
be none as to its legal force.
See also, Jones on Evidence, Section 9.1, Declarations

as to

Private Boundaries, and Wiamore on Evidence, 3d Ed. Section 1563.
The testimony in question is pertinent to establish that the
fence line was never relied upon in mutual acquiescence.
POINT IV
PRIORITY OF TITLE IS FOUND IN THE
JUDD TITLE.
As set forth above, because the only issue properly before
the trial court was to determine which of the two deed lines was
correct based upon priority of title, it is necessary to address
the Hutchings1 claims of merger of title.
Undisputed testimony at trial, that of Glen Christensen, of
Provo Land Title Company, revealed that the Judd property was
deeded out of a U.S. land patent in 183 3
12

and that the Hutchings1

property was so deeded in 1884.
based

upon

computer

plotted

(R. 135-7).

maps

from

the

Department and based upon record titles.

His testimony was
Utah

(R. 138).

County

Plat

The overlap

in descriptions was created at the time of the patent and has
existed since the patent.
He further testified that a Mr. Willis Strong was once the
owner of both parcels of ground.
ground

using

patent.

the

same

legal

He deeded out both parcels of

description

that

came

from

the

He deeded out the Hutchings1 property prior to deeding

out the plaintiffs1 property; however, it is the position of the
plaintiffs that this was

immaterial

in that there was not a

merger of title in view of the fact that the same legal description came in as went out and that the same conflict in descriptions existed.
Further, it is axiomatic that in property disputes, that
where there exists a clash of boundaries in two deeds from the
same grantor (in this instance, the 183 3 and 1834 grants from the
United States patent), the title to the first deed executed is
superior.

Groenwald v. Camano Bluepoint Oyster Co., 81 P. 2d 826

(Wash. 1938) .
CONCLUSION
The only question properly before the trial court was to
determine which deed line title should have been quieted.
13

The

Judds submit that even title quieted in the Hutchings1 deed line
would have been preferable to title quieted in a fence line which
has been moved over the years and which was never intended to be
a property boundary.
Based upon the 1833 patent, appellants respectfully seek a
reversal with title quieted based upon the Judd description.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ift^av of June, 1986.
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DATED this

(P,^"-" day of June, 1986.

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellants
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
day of June, 198 6,
Mr. Michael J. Petro
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Explin
Attorneys for Respondents
43 East 200 North
Post Office Box "L"
Provo, Utah 84603

DON R. PETERSEN
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DON R. PETERSEN, for:
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ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CLAIR W. and GLADYS JUDD FAMILY
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Plaintiffs,
STIPULATION
vs.
BERNELL L. HUTCHINGS, MRS.
BERNELL HUTCHINGS, RONALD J.
SHERMAN and MRS. RONALD J.
SHERMAN,

Case No. 69,183

Defendants.
COME NOW the parties of the above-entitled action and stipulate through
their attorneys of record that in order to simplify

the trial of this case, that

the following facts are admitted as being true and accurate.
1.

Donald

C. Cole is a licensed, registered

land

surveyor

who has

surveyed the properties of the plaintiff and the defendant.
2.

Set forth

on Exhibit "A", which Exhibit

is attached

hereto and

incorporated herein by reference is a photostatic copy of part of Donald C. Cole
Survey.
3.

That in respect to the dispute over the property on the west side of

the defendant's property, which is marked from Point

W

A" to Point "G" in blue,

there is no dispute as to the proper boundary and title to the property can and
shall be quieted in the name of the plaintiff on the deed line which deed line is
marked in blue.

That the defendants' claim no right, title, or interest beyond

the deed line designated in blue Point "A" to Point "GM.

The plaintiffs may move

the fence that now exists from its present location to the deed line description
designated in blue from Point "A" to Point "G".
4.

That the issues to be tried by the Court involve the property

designated as a southern portion of the defendants' property and the northern
portion of the plaintiffs' property.

There are set forth certain colored markings

which are indicated as follows:
a. Point "A" to Point "B" in black is the present fence line.
b.

Point

"C" to

Point

"DH designated

in

red,

is

the

Hutchings' deed line.
c. Point "E" to Point "F", in yellow, is the Judd deed line.
5.

The issue before the Court and to be resolved by the Court is the

question, what is the proper boundary between the plaintiffs' and the defendants'
property, that is, should it be at the present fence line designated in black,
Point "A" to Point "B", should it be the Hutchings' deed line, designated as Point
"C" to Point "Dw in red, or whether it should be the Judd deed line, designated in
yellow, from Point "E" to Point "F".
6.

A further issue to be resolved by the Court is in the event the Court

determines that the correct boundary line is not at the current fence line, who
pays for the expenses of moving the fence to its correct location?
2

7.

The last issue to be determined by the Court is what, if

damages have the plaintiff's suffered in respect to the disputed boundary line?
DATED this *£_ day of A*£«t, 1985.

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
DATED th is ^ day of

st, 1985.

MICHAEL J^PEf-Rt), for
Attorneys for Defendants
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